colin powell and willamette university and iraq war

Colin Powell's answer to the first question on the Iraq War should have left no doubt in anyone's mind that he was fully on-board with the Bush Administration in attacking Iraq. He presented the Administration approach to the war, referred to weapons of mass destruction (but, only from 1988), and talked about the viciousness of Saddam Husssein towards his own people. We are there, he said, to give them a "chance at democracy." We should stay there until things get better. We have stayed the course in previous wars in the 20th century (he listed WWI and WWII and Korea, but somehow didn't mention Viet Nam) and the world was better for it. The problems of "nation building" are very difficult, and we shouldn't kid ourselves into thinking we can do it easily. So far, an Adminstration spokesman. But then, two things made me see him differently, as perhaps not simply a sort of tragic victim of sorts, but also a man who might not understand the phrase "moral compass," a phrase he used twice, in ways that at least I would understand.

The Speech at the UN

The United States adoped a new security policy in September 2002 justifying pre-emptive international strikes when formerly there had to be either an attack against us or the threat of imminent attack. I have treated that theme elsewhere. I believe that we were on a course to war after that which could not have been stopped. In November 2002 the UN Security Counsel passed a resolution to the effect that Iraq was in "material breach" of its obligations under a dozen previous UN resolutions. We were going to War after that resolution, I believe, and not even an Act of God could have stopped us. But Powell believed that we should at least try to get the UN on board. After all, the UN Security Council had supported the first Gulf War in 1990-91. In addition, it might be nice to try to develop and cultivate respectful relationships with allies around the world. And, so he had the opportunity to make his case to the UN in February 2003 about why the UN should support a war against Iraq. It was a foregone conclusion before his speech that he would be unable to get Security Council backing. But he "made his best case."

Tonight I learned for the first time that he had only four days to try to convince himself that the aluminum tubes discovered by satellite technology actually contained nuclear weapons. In fact, he didn't know and his aides couldn't tell him with any confidence that these contained the weapons of mass destruction that he, along with the rest of the Bush Adminstration, wanted so badly to find in Iraq. But here is the tragedy. If we could have taken a little more time, perhaps a week, possibly a month, we could have discovered what was in those aluminum tubes. As the UN weapons inspectors began to say in February 2003, Iraq was becoming more cooperative and soon, if they had time to do their job, they could conclusively determine whether Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States or any other power, for that matter.

But Powell had no time. He had to make a decision right away. And, he chose wrong. He chose to go with the weapons of mass destruction theory, which has since proven wrong. The tragedy of only having "four more days" to make one of the most important decisions of any Secretary of State is that it seemed that he was being inexorably drawn along by forces beyond his control. The Adminstiration had decided to go to War. He wasn't absolutely sure about the quality of their information. He wasn't even reasonably sure. But the clock was running. And it was a timetable set by someone else. Rather than taking his time (after all, in the position of Secretary of State he is no longer a military man who has to answer questions right away) and giving some kind of "moral compass" to an Administration which seemed irretreviably committed to war at that time, he went along with a decision which has and will not only destroy many innocent lives but will bog us down politically as a nation for years to come.

Ah, the Moral Compass

And that leads me to the final point, the "moral compass" argument. He stressed in answer to a student that one of the most important things a young person should have as s/he faces the future is a "moral compass." Who could disagree? Who would even want to discuss it? But the interesting thing is Powell completely misunderstood the only question which posed a genuine moral dilemma. The question related to loyalites. Where does one stand when the government one serves or the country one loves (and is bound to serve) is making a decision which is morally abhorrent to the individual? What is the individual to do in this situation? The question was by no means a soft ball lobbed up for him to smash out of the park. It was, actually, a gentle invitation for Powell to consider his role in the February 2003 events. What would HE do, was the question, when confronted with such a moral dilemma? The question was clear and good.

How did he respond? He talked about the role of conscientious objectors in America's history. He mentioned that there were churches who taught that you shouldn't take up arms. He mentioned that moral conflicts are difficult things for people but, when you faced them, you had to take them very seriously. In other words, he didn't touch the question.

Conclusion

Granted, he could have misunderstood the question. It is sometimes difficult to answer questions "on your feet" for an hour, especially if the tone you want to set is one of genial acceptance and pleasant "give and take." But the combination of his admission of a compressed time schedule in making a crucial decision as Secretary of State and his seeming tone-deafness when the question of how he conceived of the tension between competing loyalties suggests that he may not have seen his presentation in February 2003 as possibly partaking of a moral dilemma. If it was a mistake, or even a failure, you are to learn from them and, as he said, "throw them over your shoulder." Too bad that some of the rest of us can't so easily give these issues the heave-ho.

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