nicomachean ethics and book v and justice

The Doctrine of the Mean, discussed in the previous essay, might seem to have an air of artificiality to it. I am generally suspicious of neat systems which tend to place all human actions in nicely constructed boxes. But Greek thinkers had a habit of dividing things into groups of threes or fours. For example, both Plato and Aristotle thought of the human soul as tripartite. We have an intellectual part, a sensual part and the appetitive part (this is Plato's terminology; Aristotle is somewhat different). Ancient political philosophers spoke about the three kinds of government (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) and, as the systems became more sophisticated, three kinds of degeneration of these. So, the fact that Aristotle came up with the doctrine of the mean, with two extremes, sort of "fits it" to the way that Greek authors thought. I think it is a useful way to look at what I would call a "spectrum of human actions."

This essay treats Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, parts of which were assigned for 9/5 reading. Book V is very difficult to follow because it partakes of the "lecture note" reality of Aristotle's works. And, to make matters worse, our editors excerpt passages from here and there, with no notes and in a bad English translation, so that almost nothing is clear. Finally, I think that Aristotle really doens't have a lot to say about justice in this book; his most long-lasting contribution may be his words about equity in 5.10. I hope to try to clarify the flow of Book V in these final two essays.

Justice in the Nicomachean Ethics

Justice, for Aristotle, means the same as "righteousness" or "honesty." It is a virtue which regulates all proper conduct within society, in the relations of individuals with one another, and to some extent event he proper attitude of an individual toward him/herself. In this latter regard he is similar to Plato in the Republic, where Plato argued that justice is a sort of inner harmony or self-regulation that enables a person to act with rhythmic balace. Here is an essay on that concept in Plato.

Justice is both universal--relating to conduct between people in society-- and particular/partial for Aristotle. Our reading, beginning in 5.2, discusses justice as a part of virtue or justice in a particular sense. He goes on to suggest that partial justice can be further divided into distributive, rectificatory and reciprocal justice (5.3-5.5). While he is getting to these points he also asserts that justice can either mean lawfulness or fairness and that the laws encourage people to behave virtuously. I think that Aristotle has "proved" none of these points and, indeed, the example of Socrates might be a counterexample that proves the opposite. Hadn't Socrates indeed acted contrary to the laws of Athens, at least according to the jury which had sentenced him to death? (We know some of the charges made against Socrates, at least if we can say that Socrates accurately summarized them in his self-defense in the Apology). In any case, I find that Aristotle isn't very helpful in exploring the relationship of justice and lawfulness.

But, as I said, he talks about partial justice in 5.2, and then goes into a discussion of distributive and rectificatory justice. The former he describes as follows:

"One form of partial justice and of what is just in this sense is found in the distribution of honors, of material good, or of anything else that can be divided among those who have a share in the political system. For in these matters it is possible for a man to have a share equal or unequal to that of his neighbor" (5.2).

Thus, distributive justice, for Aristotle, is the division of goods to people based on some factor he doesn't describe, but probably a person's position in society or heredity. Again, this doesn't help us much in answering the question of "Why?"--i.e., why should a society declare that part of justice is unequal distribution of society's goods?

In 5.3 he describes the nature of this distributive justice more fully. He says that the "just is necessarily both median and equal, and it is relative, and (it is just) for certain individuals." Then he interposes the first of three mathematical formulas (all of which our book ignores). "There will be the same equality between the persons and the shares: the ratio between the shares will be the same as between the persons." If persons, therefore, are not equal in society, their shares will not be equal. Then, showing his possibly "classist" biases in all their splendor, he says:

"Everyone agrees that in distributions the just share must be given on the basis of what one deserves, though not everyone would name the same criterion of deserving: democrats say it is free birth, oligarchs that it is wealth or noble birth, and aristocrats that it is excellence" (5.3).

Distributive justice, then, is something proportional, based on what you "deserve."

Rectificatory Justice

He is much more complete, however, in his discussion of rectification as an element of justice. True to form, however, he has to divide rectification into two sub-categores: (1) voluntary transactions and (2) involuntary transactions (5.2). The point is that society has an interest in "rectifying" the situation when someone has done something amiss to someone else. Rectificatory justice, then, is the area we normally would refer to as "justice" in our speech. We speak of the "justice system" as attempting to "rectify" wrongs through punishment/restitution/deterrence. Whereas justice in the distributive sense is geometric, in the rectificatory sense it is arithmetic. As Aristotle says: "As the unjust in this sense is inequality, the just tries to restore the equilibrium." Or, practically speaking:

"When one man has inflicted and another received a wound, or when one man has killed and the other has been killed, the doing and suffering are unequally divided; by inflicting a loss on the offender, the judge tries to take away his gain and restore the equilibrium," 5.3.

I don't think this is too complicated. But Aristotle goes into some detail trying to illustrate what he means.

The next (last) essay will complete these thoughts.

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