Begay v United States and Armed Career Criminal Act

My summary of the facts of the case is important if you want fully to understand the decision. Basically the issue is whether Begay's three prior DUI felony arrests in New Mexico constituted "violent felonies" under federal law so that he would receive an enhanced 15-year sentence when he commited another crime. By a 6-3 majority (opinion by Justice Breyer), the Court concluded that those DUI's did not constitute "violent felonies" under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Here are the facts and the conclusions of the Court.

The Law

In the words of the Syllabus of the Decision (summary), we have:

"The Armed Career Criminal Act (Act) imposes a special mandatory 15-year prison term upon a felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm and who has three or more prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “a violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act defines “violent felony” as, inter alia, a crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (hereinafter clause (ii)). After petitioner Begay pleaded guilty to felony possession of a firearm, his presentence report revealed he had 12 New Mexico convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which state law makes a felony (punishable by a prison term of more than one year) the fourth (or subsequent) time an individual commits it. Based on these convictions, the sentencing judge concluded that Begay had three or more “violent felony” convictions and, therefore, sentenced him to an enhanced 15-year sentence. The Tenth Circuit rejected Begay's claim that DUI is not a “violent felony” under the Act."

The Court's Argument

This was a case of statutory interpretation. Justice Breyer argued that sec. 924's language doesn't permit a broad interpretation:

"Even assuming that DUI involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under clause (ii), the crime falls outside the clause's scope because it is simply too unlike clause (ii)'s example crimes to indicate that Congress intended that provision to cover it.."

What were the examples?

"Clause (ii)'s listed examples-burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives-should be read as limiting the crimes the clause covers to those that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves. Their presence in the statute indicates that Congress meant for the statute to cover only similar crimes, rather than every crime that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.."

Furthermore, he argued:

"If Congress meant the statute to be all encompassing, it would not have needed to include the examples at all. Moreover, if clause (ii) were meant to include all risky crimes, Congress likely would not have included clause (i), which includes crimes that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” And had Congress included the examples solely for quantitative purposes, demonstrating no more than the degree of risk of physical injury sufficient to bring a crime within the statute's scope, it would likely have chosen examples that better illustrated the degree of risk it had in mind rather than these that are far from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses. The Government's argument that the word “otherwise” just after the examples is sufficient to demonstrate that they do not limit the clause's scope is rejected because “otherwise” can refer to a crime that is, e.g., similar to the examples in respect to the degree of risk it produces, but different in respect to the way or manner in which it produces that risk.."

Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. He couldn't go along with the majority because he didn't think that the language of the statute unambiguously suggested a narrow construction. Rather, since it was ambiguous, he applied the common-law principle of the "rule of lenity" in criminal law cases to agree with the majority.

The dissenters (Alito, Souter and Thomas..why Souter??) suggested that the Court's narrowing interpretation "simply cannot be reconciled with the statutory text."

Conclusion

As you recall from my summary of the case, the dissenting judge (McConnell) in the lower court (whose decision I predicted the Court would follow) did an extensive amount of legislative-historical research to reach the point arrived at by the majority in this case. I think this decision was a decision for common sense, as well as for the importance of reading the legislative history--especially when it is readily available and seemingly unambiguously helpful.

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