Federal Express v. Holowecki II

This 7-2 decision of the US Supreme Court, upholding the decision of the lower court that Ms. Kennedy had properly submitted a "charge" to the EEOC in December 2001, thus permitting her to bring her suit for age discrimination against Federal Express in April 2002, was somewhat surprising to me at first. Upon more mature consideration, however, it made a lot of sense (see below). What was crucial in the Court's decision, I believe, was their conclusion that the EEOC's regulations interpreting the concept of a "charge" did not require this charge to be filed on a particular form. The purpose of this essay is to describe the Supreme Court's leading points in affirming the Second Circuit. You should probably read my summary of the background facts of the case before proceeding.

Framing the Issue

As Justice Kennedy said:

"The immediate question before us is the timeliness of the suit filed by one of the plaintiffs below, Patricia Kennedy, referred to here as “respondent.” Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's action, contending respondent had not filed her charge with the EEOC at least 60 days before filing suit, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Respondent countered that she filed a valid charge on December 11, 2001, by submitting EEOC Form 283."

He went to list the two major questions the Court needed to consider:

"This case presents two distinct questions: What is a charge as the ADEA uses that term? And were the documents respondent filed in December 2001 a charge?"

A Charge By Any Other Name...

The first half of the decision is concerned with two issues: reading the EEOC regulations which define "charge" and then deciding what degree of deference the regulations, and the EEOC's construal of these regulations, deserves. Though there are several confusing administrative law cases which try to answer these questions, a good rule of thumb is as follows--if the regulations are clear and seem to cover all the bases and if the agency has been pretty consistent in developing policies to interpret the regulations, the Court will only overturn the regs. if they are manifestly unreasonable or unjust. If, however, the agency's regs are not a model of clarity and have led to inconsistent application, deference is a much trickier issue. Though courts of law try to develop "rules" that guide other courts in every situation, the basic rule of thumb is that the more screwed up the agency's rules and processes are, the less deference they are given. With this wonderful "legal" principle in view, we turn back to the case.

Justice Kennedy spent a lot of time working through the regs. defining what a charge is. Guess what? He concluded that the EEOC is less than clear in whether it required a certain form to be filled out to constitute a charge or not. To cut to the chase, the Court concluded that:

"the definition of charge respondent advocates- i.e., that it need conform only to 29 CFR § 1626.6-is in considerable tension with the structure and purposes of the ADEA. The agency's interpretive position-the request-to-act requirement-provides a reasonable alternative that is consistent with the statutory framework. No clearer alternatives are within our authority or expertise to adopt; and so deference to the agency is appropriate under Skidmore. We conclude as follows: In addition to the information required by the regulations, i.e., an allegation and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a charge it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee."

Therefore, it wasn't necessary for Ms. Kennedy to have filled out a particular form in order for it to constitute a "charge" under the law. As long as she alleged the things mentioned in the bolded paragraph, her submission would be considered a "charge." Thus the question becomes, could her filing be "reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee?"

Was Her Submission a "Charge"?

To cut to the chase, the Court went on:

"Having determined that the agency acted within its authority in formulating the rule that a filing is deemed a charge if the document reasonably can be construed to request agency action and appropriate relief on the employee's behalf, the question is whether the filing here meets this test. The agency says it does, and we agree. The agency's determination is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces."

When Kennedy wrote in her affidavit that she wanted to "force [FedEx] to end [its] age discrimination plan," she was stating in an unambiguous fashion that she was charging the Petitioner with conduct that violated the statute (the ADEA). The fact that the EEOC didn't treat Kennedy's filing as a charge meant that both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA's informal dispute resolution process. On remand, the court that hears the merits of Kennedy's dispute can try to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings in order to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement.

So, Kennedy "won," which means that her suit can go forward. Perhaps the fact that the victory only allows her to get into court is the reason why she got a 7-2 decision from the Court. She still has to prove her case; the Court was only saying that the courtroom door is open to her...

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