Chambers v. United States--Whether not returning is "escape"

Is failure to return to prison after furlough or work release an "escape" under the law, an "escape" that can constitute a "violent felony," a "violent felony" that can (it did in this case), constitute a third violent felony by someone, which felony then leads to an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison (when he normally would have received a maximum of 10 years in prison) for the underlying crime--felon in possession of a firearm? This chain of events is implicated in our case for today.

This criminal law case deals with an aspect of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("Act"), a statute that the Court has construed several times in the past two terms. The Act's primariy purpose is to serve as an enhancement vehicle for defendants convicted of being a felon in possession of a handgun if they previously have been convicted of three crimes of violence. If a defendant meets these criteria, s/he receives a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison (the maximum is life imprisonment), whereas if the Act's provisions didn't apply to the felon, a ten-year sentence would be the maximum that could be assessed. At issue in this case is whether the crime of failing to return to prison after work release is considered a crime of violence from the perspective of the statute (language quoted below) so that it can constitute one of the three prior felonies leading to sentence enhancement under the Act. This is the issue of the case; let's now put it in "legal garb."

The Facts and Law of This Case

The facts of this case and the decisions of the lower courts are taken primarily from the two briefs for and in opposition to a writ of certiorari.

Chambers pleased guilty in the US District Court for the Southern District of IL to being a felon in possession of a handgun, in violation of 18 USC 922(g). Under normal circumstances, the maximum penalty for such a crime would be ten years in prison. However, in this case, the court sentenced Chambers to 188 months imprisonment (a little more than 15 1/2 years) because the court held he violated the Act, 18 USC sec 924(e). The court based its decision on the statutory language providing that a felon in possession of a firearm gets 15 years imprisonment, at a minimum, if that person has "three previous convictions...for a violent felony or a serious drug offense" (18 USC sec 924(e)). What is a "violent felony?" Under the Act it is any crime:

"punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another," 18 USC sec 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A federal grand jury charged Chambers with possessing a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 USC sec 922 (g)(1). After arraignment on this charge, the government filed an information charging him with an enhanced sentence under the Act because of three prior IL felony convictions. They were: (a) aggravated robbery in 1998; (b) unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a public housing in 1999 [why wasn't he in jail between 1998 and 1999??] and (c) escape in 1999.

It is his "escape" that is the subject of this appeal. The "escape" involved his failure to return from furlough or work release on three occasions. Non-return to prison is "escape" under IL law, and the US district court concluded that escape was a violent crime, under the language of the Act. The language of the 10th Circuit, in another case, provides the rationale:

"[E]very escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may non explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do so. A defendant who escapes from a jail is likely no possess a variety of supercharged emotions, and in evading those trying to recapture him, may feel threatened by police officers, ordinary citizens, or even fellow escapees. Consequently, violence could erupt at any time. Indeed, even in a case where a defendant escapes from a jail by stealth and injures no one in the process, there is still a serious potential risk that injury will result when officers find the defendant and attempt to place him in custody."

But in this case, as his defense team argued, Chambers hadn't hurt anyone or threatened anyone. He didn't "break out" of a facility or otherwise seem do anything to constitute violence. Indeed, as they characterized his "escape" it was a "passive" rather than an "active" escape. Yet, under the law of IL, not showing up from furlough or work release constituted "escape" under the law, and "escape" was a felony that led to sentence enhancement. The district court determined that Chambers' advisory guieline range was from 188 to 235 months, and it sentenced him to the low end of that range--188 months.

The 7th Circuit affirmed his conviction. Though Judge Posner, writing for the panel, said that as an "original" matter it might seem strange that an act that had no feature of violence to it would could be so characterized, under the precedents in the 7th Circuit he felt bound to conclude that Chambers' not returning to prison after furlough or work release constituted a "violent crime." His colleagues agreed.

Conclusion

So, that is how the case comes to the Court. Is this really simply a "statutory" case, and if a person's action fits under the statutory category of escape (which it does in IL), it is for that reason a "violent" crime? Or, should the Court do a more nuanced approach to the statute? Should it conclude that "serious potential risk of physical injury to another" really should mean what the statute says--and that the defendant's conduct must actually have posed that risk? So, here we have a kind of interesting tableau. Those who seemingly are most interested in "literal" statutory interpretion" (the conservatives) would have a hard time justifying non-return to prison as constituting per se a serious potential risk of physical injury to another--without stretching the meaning of each word almost beyond the breaking point. Yet, one might argue that this is an "open and shut" case, because once a crime has been defined as 'escape,' even if it is a 'passive' escape, and it follows quite quickly that escape is a 'violent' crime. I believe the Court will probably affirm the 7th Circuit, but I would think this is a rather close case.

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