Fitzgerald v. Barnstable (Decision)

In another fairly technical case, the Supreme Court acted as I hoped they would by reversing the 1st Circuit and holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 doesn't preclude a sec. 1983 action alleging gender discrimination in schools. Though it is enough simply to state that holding, a few facts of the case, as well as some words about the holding, might be helpful.

Background Facts

In a nutshell, the Court's factual summary provides:

"Petitioners filed suit against respondents, the local school district’s governing board and superintendent, alleging that their response to allegations of sexual harassment of petitioners’ daughter by an older student was inadequate, raising claims under, inter alia, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), and 42 U. S. C. §1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Among its rulings, the District Court dismissed the §1983 claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under this Court’s precedents, Title IX’s implied private remedy was sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the use of §1983 to advance constitutional claims."

In my judgment, the facts of the case really helped petitioners--at the Supreme Court level. You may want to return to my case summary and pore over these facts.

Holding/Decision in the Case

In order to divine whether a particular statute was, in the minds of the enacting Congress, an exclusive means for redress of a grievance that arguably fits under its language, courts have to look at the language of the statute. Is there a reference to the statute's exclusivity? Does it imply exclusivity? If it is silent on the issue, what can one properly infer about other avenues for redress? Or, alternatively, if no language exists about exclusivity of the statutory remedy, is there some insight in the statute's remedial scheme that may give us insight into its exclusivity? Thus, a curious and competent judge will try to lok for all manner of indications that there may, or may not be, an exclusivity in the statute. This introduction then helps us understand the Court's inquiry.

"In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 ; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 ; and Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113 , this Court found that particular statutory enactments precluded §1983 claims where it was established that Congress intended the statute’s remedial scheme to “be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert [such] claims,” Smith, supra, at 1009. In determining whether Congress intended for a subsequent statute to preclude the enforcement of a federal right under §1983, the Court has placed primary emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute’s remedial scheme. See Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20. Where the §1983 claim alleges a constitutional violation, a lack of congressional intent to preclude may also be inferred from a comparison of the rights and protections of the other statute and those existing under the Constitution."

So, how does Title IX "measure up" on this score?

"In the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, and in light of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, it must be concluded that Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for §1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional rights."

In addition, Title IX's only express enforcement mechanism is quite paltry:

"Title IX’s only express enforcement mechanism, 20 U. S. C. §1682, is an administrative procedure resulting in the withdrawal of federal funding from noncompliant institutions. This Court has also recognized an implied private right of action, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, for which both injunctive relief and damages are available, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U. S. 60. These remedies stand in stark contrast to the “unusually elaborate,” “carefully tailored,” and “restrictive” enforcement schemes of the statutes in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes."

Conclusion

So, there you have it--the expansion of plaintiffs' rights in the Roberts Court. Who would have expected it? But it also goes to show you that when you seek an expansion of the law in a way that favors plaintiffs, you better take pains to make sure you have the most sympathetic plaintiff imaginable.

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