Jiminez v. Quarterman (Decision)

As predicted, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in this case, by a unanimous decision. It had to do with how one "counted days" in order to "count out" a defendant who was trying to reopen an earlier conviction. The bottom line for this case is that Quarterman actually will get his day in court once again. This is a case for those who want to "count days" and for those fascinated by, or paid to figure out, how to read a "one-year" provision in the federal AEDPA law (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). Numbers are complicated things for most lawyers, however, and even the Syllabus of the Decision for the Court, which never makes a mistake, made a mistake here on numbers (see below). But because this case is only of interest to a few specialists in criminal law, I will content myself with quoting from that Syllabus...

First, let's describe the situation or facts of the case.

"After petitioner’s state conviction for burglary became final on October 11, 1996, the state appellate court held in state habeas proceedings that petitioner had been denied his right to appeal and granted him the right to file an out-of-time appeal. He filed the appeal, his conviction was affirmed, and his time for seeking certiorari in this Court expired on January 6, 2004. Petitioner filed a second state habeas application on December 6, 2004, which was denied 355 days later, on June 29, 2005. [By the way, here is the error. June 29, 2005 is not 355 days after December 6, 2004. It is about 205 days later...]. He then filed a federal habeas petition on July 19, 2005, relying on 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A) to establish its timeliness. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the one-year limitations period for seeking review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) begins on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Petitioner argued that his judgment became final on January 6, 2004, when time expired for seeking certiorari review of the decision in his out-of-time appeal, and that his July 19, 2005, petition was timely because the calculation of AEDPA’s 1-year limitation period excludes the 355 days “during which [his] properly filed application for State post-conviction … review … [was] pending,” §2244(d)(2). The District Court disagreed, ruling that the proper start date for calculating AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period under §2244(d)(1)(A) was October 11, 1996, when petitioner’s conviction first became final. The District Court dismissed the federal habeas petition as time barred. The Fifth Circuit denied petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability."

The Court held that where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but before the defendant has first sought federal habeas relief, his judgment is not "final" for purposes of Sec. 2244(d)(1)(A) until the conclusion of the out-of-time direct apeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari review of that appeal. Quoting, then, from the Syllabus:

"This Court must enforce plain statutory language according to its terms. See, e.g., Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526. Under §2244(d)(1)(A)’s plain language, once the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of petitioner’s conviction on September 25, 2002, the conviction was no longer final for §2244(d)(1)(A) purposes. Rather, the order granting an out-of-time appeal restored the pendency of the direct appeal, and petitioner’s conviction was again capable of modification through direct appeal to the state courts and to this Court on certiorari review. Therefore, it was not until January 6, 2004, when time for seeking certiorari review of the decision in the out-of-time appeal expired, that petitioner’s conviction became “final” through “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” under §2244(d)(1)(A). The Court rejects respondent’s argument that using the later date created by the state court’s decision to reopen direct review, thus resetting AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period, undermines the policy of finality that Congress established in §2244(d)(1). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214."

There you have it. A unanimous reversal on a not-too-interesting case. The issue does arise, however, of how and why courts, which supposedly have smart people on them, can read numbers so differently. You wonder if the makers of the law really hadn't thought things through when they passed the Act in 1996...

4043