Knowles v. Mirzayance

Tuesday, January 13, 2009 will be "Sixth Amendment Day" at the Supreme Court, I suppose, since this case, along with Brillon, deal with that Amendment. Here, however, rather than the "speedy trial" portion of the Amendment being implicated, we have the "effective assistance of counsel" prong at issue.*

[*Here is the text of the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."]

Actually, the language of the Sixth Amendment says that the defendant shall have "assistance of counsel" in his/her defense, but the Court has interpreted that phrase most recently to conclude that it must exclude "ineffective" assistance of counsel. Well, the issue here is whether ineffective assistance can be found where the lawyers withdrew the defendant's only affirmative defense (not guilty by reason of insanity) because they saw no hope of their client winning on that ground--thus subjecting the defendant to the sentencing (or "sanity", as it is known in CA) phase of his trial without providing any defense. In deciding this issue there is a significant federal statute, the federal habeas corpus law, that is implicated. In addition, a subsidiary issue is whether a circuit court of appeals, the reviewing body, can substitute its own factual findings for the findings of the district court without having to find that the district court's findings were "clearly erroneous" (normally the standard for factual reversal on appeal).

One reason to think that the Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit here (which granted Mr. Mirzayance habeas relief) is that this is the second time the case has come to the Court and the Ninth Circuit seemed to ignore or, at least, not consider the Supreme Court's ruling in an unrelated case that might have been dispositive for dealing with its case. Thus, the Court might have to slap the Ninth Circuit upside the head (which it loves to do) a second time. I can almost hear Justices Scalia and Thomas sharpening their pencils...

Relevant Facts

Mirzayance fatally stabbed and shot his 19 year-old cousin in her family's home. He gathered up the "evidence" of the crime, left an "alibi phone message" on her answering machine and left the premises. He turned himself in to police and confessed the killing a few hours later. He was charged under CA law with first degree murder. He entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGI"). Under CA law, such pleas result in a bifurcated trial. In the first phase the jury renders a guilty or not guilty verdict. Then, if it reaches the former verdict, a second phase occurs in which the jury determines whether the defendant has proven he was not sane at the time of the offense (CA Penal Code sec. 1026). The burden is on the defendant, by the preponderance of the evidence, to show that he was legally insane at the time of the offense. Legal insanity, in CA, is defined as whether he failed to appreciate the nature and quality of his actions at the time he committed the crime or failed the appreciate the wrongfulness of those actions (CA Penal Code sec. 25(b)).

Mirzayance's trial counsel's (appropriately named Wager) strategy was to get a guilt-phase verdict of second-degree murder and then secure an NGI verdict in the sentencing/sanity phase. However, the jury returned a verdict of premediated and deliberate first-degree murder. After conferring with his co-counsel, Wager advised his client to withdraw the NGI plea, his only defense in the sentencing phase of the trial. He did, and the court sentenced him to a statutorily-mandated term of 29 years to life. Wager's reason for recommending this strategy to his client is that the major witness who would have been helpful for this defense in the sentencing phase (Dr. Satz) already testified at trial that Mirzayance's mental impairments deprived him of the ability to perform the more demanding tasks of deliberating and planning a murder. Obviously, since the jury found Mirzayance guilty of first-degree murder, it didn't credit Dr. Satz's testimony. The impression I get from reading the Petition for Certiorari is that Wager felt that putting on such a defense would not only not work in the sentencing phase, but it might be counterproductive.

Challenging Counsel's Decision

So, the major legal question in this case is whether this decision by Mirzayance's counsel constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In state habeas proceedings, both courts decided it didn't. However, at the federal level, a different statute is in view, and under this statute the federal habeas plea of Mirzayance was eventually granted. Here is the relevant section of the law:

"(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 USC sec. 2254.

Since Mr. Mirzayance's claim was adjudicated in state court, the only way it could be considered favorably in federal court is if resulted in a decision that was contrary to clearly established federal law. More about that below.

The federal district court, however, also denied relief. Yet the Ninth Circuit decided, however, to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to whether the trial court believed that Wager had rendered ineffective assistance. Despite the fact that the trial court believed that he was not ineffective, the US District Court decided that the Ninth Circuit's remand order was a "mandate" that "destined Mirzayance to relief." So, it concluded that the NGI defense was "viable and strong" and that there was a reasonable change that the defendant would have obtained "a better trial outcome had that defense been presented." The Ninth Circuit affirmed, in a 2-1 decision. The US Supreme Court vacated the decision, and told the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its decision based on a just-released Supreme Court case, Carey v. Musladin. The Musladin case reflected on what constituted "clearly established federal law." In short, the Supreme Court gave a very narrow reading to the "contrary to federal law" language in the just-quoted statute. Unless there was a Supreme Court case directly on point, it said, no habeas relief ought to be granted at the federal level if it was rejected at the state level....

Thus, the Supremes will deal with this case a second time (since the Ninth Circuit upheld its decision on remand). I smell reversal here, which would mean that the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel, which are always evolving, would be pretty high--i.e., counsel has to make a pretty egregious blunder for this standard to be invoked.

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