Van de Camp v. Goldstein and prosecutorial immunity

This unusual case out of California has to do with the scope of prosecutorial immunity in bringing a case against a defendant. The underlying case here was the 1980 conviction of Goldstein for murder. His conviction primarily rested on the testimony of two witnesses, one of whom was a jailhouse informant. Unbeknowst to the prosecutors in the case [but known to the District Attorney and his Deputy], the jailhouse informant was granted benefits for cooperating in the prosecution of Goldstein, benefits that the snitch denied receiving when examined on the stand. In Dec. 2002, Goldstein's conviction was vacated by the US District Court for the Central District of CA. He had, therefore, served nearly 23 years in jail for a crime he didn't do. That would wreck not just anyone's day but about 1/2 of his adult life.

So, Goldstein didn't want to take the dismissal of his case calmly. He decided to go after the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office. But whom do you attack and on what theory do you base your case? Goldstein realized that the actual prosecutors were provided absolute immunity for prosecution in a case like this. Even if they knew that informants were given benefits for their testimony and lied about it, they wouldn't be subject to prosecution--even though they might be subject to bar discipline, and a new trial for the defendant would be ordered. Goldstein, therefore, couldn't go against the prosecuting attorneys. What he decided to do was to raise a claim against the Los Angeles District Attorney (Van de Camp) in office in 1980 and his Deputy Livesay and allege that they were deficient in administrative oversight of the office--by not choosing to train line prosecutors in information management systems regarding the handing out of benefits to informants.

Supreme Court precendent has held that to the extent that supervising attorneys were involved in the "judicial" phase of the case, either in preparing documents or participating in trial, then they, too would enjoy the shield of absolute immunity from prosecution enjoyed by line prosecutors. However, the Supreme Court has held that when supervisors only have general administrative oversight either of an office or a case, they are not protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity.

The Question Here

The issue here, then, is whether the non-prosecuting District Attorney and his Deputy should be open to suit because they had a policy of paying off informants for their testimony and not allowing prosecutorial staff access to this information. Here is the language taken from Goldstein's Second Amended Complaint. Goldstein alleged that defendants Van de Camp and Livesay:

"purposefully or with deliberate indifference failed to create any system for the Deputy District Attorneys handling criminal cases to access information pertaining to the benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information, and failed to train Deputy District Attorneys to disseminate information pertaining to benefits provided to jailhouse informants and other impeachment information.”

As a result of this deficiency, "the Deputy District Attorneys on Mr. Goldstein's case..did not have access to any impeachment information including benefits provided to Fink (the jailhouse snitch) prior to Mr. Goldstein's conviction."

The point should be clear regarding what Goldstein is trying to do. He is arguing that had the policy been in place to share information regarding benefits to informants among all lawyers in the LA District Attorney's office, then that information would have had to be turned over to the defense. Armed with this information, the defense could have argued that Fink's testimony was motivated by monetary or other considerations. The jury, then, would have had this vital fact to take into consideration in their deliberations. As it was, the prosecutors improperly "stacked the deck" against Goldstein, garnering a conviction when in fact he was innocent. This case, then, gives us a window into the weak underbelly of prosecutorial practice, at least in LA in the early 1980s--don't disclose to the attorneys working on the case that the snitch is compensated, have the snitch get on the stand and deny that he is compensated, testify against defendant, have defendant thrown in jail. No one would ever find out....

Conclusion and Issue Before the Court

Except, in this case, Goldstein and his lawyers in 2002 found out and he was released. When Goldstein sued Van de Camp and Livesay in US District Court in 2005, the court refused to dismiss their complaint. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The ground on which both made their decision was that it was an administrative (and not trial judgment) determination that guided the DA in making this policy. Thus, it wasn't protected from the absolute immunity enjoyed by prosecutors. As the case reaches the US Supreme Court, then, those representing the DA argue that if the Court allows Goldstein to eliminate the defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity here (protecting the DA and his deputy, too) then disgruntled defendants in the future will merely start suing supervisors rather than prosecutors. We will be awash with cases ranging from the trivial to serious, and the prosecutorial work will be severely hampered. On the other hand, Goldstein argues that this type of activity has to stop, that the distinction between administrative v. actual judicial activity is a clear or manageable one, and that Goldstein's suit ought to be allowed to proceed.

If there is no penalty for prosecutorial misconduct, what is to prevent them from doing this again and again? That is what Goldstein would like to know. I think the court has a tough balancing act here, but I wouldn't be surprised if it wants to stand with prosecutors. The rationale? Lots of bad guys out there---we hope that prosecutors don't do bad things to defendants in the proces of their keeping the streets safe. That, then, is my "prediction" regarding the outcome of this case.

3879