Sup. Ct. 2008-09
Introduction to Term Oct. '08 Oral Args.
Altria Group v. Good
Altria Decision
Locke v. Karass
Locke Decision
Vaden v. Disc. Bank
Herring v. US
Herring Decision
Arizona v. Gant
Kennedy v. Plan Ad.
Kennedy Decision
Winter v. Nat. Res.
Winter Decision
Summers v. Institute
Crawford v. Nashville
Crawford Decision
Bartlett v. Strickland
Pearson v. Callahan
Pearson Decision
Moore v. US
Waddington case
Waddington Decision
Hedgepeth v. Pulido
Oregon v. Ice
Oregon/Ice Decision
Nov. '08 Oral Args.
Wyeth v. Levine
Ysursa v. Pocatello
Carcieri v. Kemp.
FCC v. Fox Telev.
US v. Eurodif S.A.
USEC v. Eurodif
Eurodif Decision
Jimenez v. Quarter.
Jimenez Decision
Negusie v. Mukasey
Van de Kamp case
Van de Kamp Decis.
Chambers v. US
Chambers Decision
US v. Hayes
Melendez-Diaz v. MA
Pleasant v Summum
Bell v. Kelly
Dec. '08 Oral Args.
KS v. CO
14 Penn Plaza case
Entergy v. EPA
PSEG v Riverkeeper
Utility v. Riverkeeper
Fitzgerald v. Barnst.
Fitzgerald Decision
Philip Morris case
Haywood v. Drown
Peake v. Sanders
Pac Bell v. Linkline
AZ v. Johnson
Arizona Decision
Cone v. Bell
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
AT & T v. Hulteen
Jan '09 Oral Args.
Coeur Alaska v. ACC
Iran v. Elahi
Harbison v. Bell
Montejo v. LA
VT v. Brillon
Knowles/Mirzayance
Puckett v. US
Boyle v. US
Corley v. US
KS v. Ventris
Nken v. Mukasey
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Van de Camp v. Goldstein II
Bill Long 1/27/09
SUMMARY OF JANUARY 26, 2009 DECISION
(Case Summary Here)
As predicted, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity applies not simply to the actual prosecutors (Assistant DA's) conducting a case, but also to the DA him/herself and associates not directly involved in the case for decisions they make that affect the conduct of the case. In this instance, the conduct in question had to do with the custom of the Los Angeles County DA to use jailhouse informants to testify, when the DA may have known that the jailhouse informant testimony was false but had not communicated that falsity to the attorneys actually arguing the case. What I didn't count on, however, was that the reversal would be unanimous. Here follows a few of the facts and the Court's reasoning, taken from the Syllabus of the Decision.
First, A Few Facts
"Respondent Goldstein was released from a California prison after he filed a successful federal habeas petition alleging that his murder conviction depended, in critical part, on the false testimony of a jailhouse informant (Fink), who had received reduced sentences for providing prosecutors with favorable testimony in other cases; that prosecutors knew, but failed to give his attorney, this potential impeachment information; and that, among other things, that failure had led to his erroneous conviction. Once released, Goldstein filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983, asserting the prosecution violated its constitutional duty to communicate impeachment information, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, due to the failure of petitioners, supervisory prosecutors, to properly train or supervise prosecutors or to establish an information system containing potential impeachment material about informants. Claiming absolute immunity, petitioners asked the District Court to dismiss the complaint, but the court declined, finding that the conduct was “administrative,” not “prosecutorial,” and hence fell outside the scope of an absolute immunity claim. The Ninth Circuit, on interlocutory appeal, affirmed."
Holding and Reasoning
The holding was said in one sentence:
"Petitioners are entitled to absolute immunity in respect to Goldstein’s supervision, training, and information-system management claims."
Now, some of the reasoning:
"Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability in §1983 suits brought against prosecutorial actions that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 , because of “concern that harassment by unfounded litigation” could both “cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties” and lead him to “shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust,” id., at 423. However, absolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as “an officer of the court,” but is instead engaged in, say, investigative or administrative tasks. Id., at 431, n. 33. To decide whether absolute immunity attaches to a particular prosecutorial activity, one must take account of Imbler’s “functional” considerations."
Thus, we look at "functional" considerations. In order for the prosecutor to be protected absolutely, his/her actions must relate to the "judicial" aspects of the case. Goldstein had argued that the work done by the DA in obtaining jailhouse informer testimony related to the 'administrative' part of the case. A moment's reflection, however, shows that this is a real stretch--getting witnesses is about as close to the 'bone' of the case as any "judicial" prosecutorial activity. So, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
"Although Goldstein challenges administrative procedures, they are procedures that are directly connected with a trial’s conduct. A prosecutor’s error in a specific criminal trial constitutes an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. The obligations here are thus unlike administrative duties concerning, e.g., workplace hiring. Moreover, they necessarily require legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion, e.g., in determining what information should be included in training, supervision, or information-system management. Given these features, absolute immunity must follow."
More could be said about the case, but this is the essence of the Court's reasoning. A unanimous reversal of a panel of the Ninth Circuit. How surprising...
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