Waddington v. Sarausad (Decision)

As predicted, the US Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the State of WA's pattern jury instructions on accomplice liability were constitutional. The Ninth Circuit would only have been upheld if the pattern jury instructions were ambiguous and if there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the prosecutor's "in for a dime, in for a dollar" argument on accomplice liability in closing argument relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This was a "conservatives v. liberals decision" but one of the "liberals," Breyer, broke ranks and joined the "conservatives," making it a 6-3 decision. Since the facts of this case drive the entire discussion, a long summary of them is important, before stating, very briefly, the law of the case.

A Long Statement of Facts

"Respondent Sarausad drove the car in a driveby shooting at a high school, which was the culmination of a gang dispute. En route to school, Ronquillo, the front seat passenger, covered his lower face and readied a handgun. Sarausad abruptly slowed down upon reaching the school, Ronquillo fired at a group of students, killing one and wounding another, and Sarausad then sped away. He, Ronquillo, and Reyes, another passenger, were tried on murder and related charges. Sarausad and Reyes, who were tried as accomplices, argued that they were not accomplices to murder because they had not known Ronquillo’s plan and had expected at most another fistfight. In her closing argument, the prosecutor stressed Sarausad’s knowledge of a shooting, noting how he drove at the scene, that he knew that fighting alone would not regain respect for his gang, and that he was “in for a dime, in for a dollar.” The jury received two instructions that directly quoted Washington’s accomplice-liability law. When it failed to reach a verdict as to Reyes, the judge declared a mistrial as to him. The jury then convicted Ronquillo on all counts and convicted Sarausad of second-degree murder and related crimes. In affirming Sarausad’s conviction, the State Court of Appeals, among other things, referred to an “in for a dime, in for a dollar” accomplice-liability theory. The State Supreme Court denied review, but in its subsequent Roberts case, it clarified that “in for a dime, in for a dollar” was not the best descriptor of accomplice liability because an accomplice must have knowledge of the crime that occurred. The court also explicitly reaffirmed its precedent that the type of jury instructions used at Sarausad’s trial comport with Washington law. Sarausad sought state postconviction relief, arguing that the prosecutor’s improper “in for a dime, in for a dollar” argument may have led the jury to convict him as an accomplice to murder based solely on a finding that he had anticipated that an assault would occur. The state appeals court reexamined the trial record in light of Roberts, but found no error requiring correction. The State Supreme Court denied Sarausad’s petition, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury and that no prejudicial error resulted from the prosecutor’s potentially improper hypothetical. Sarausad then sought review under 28 U. S. C. §2254, which, inter alia, permits a federal court to grant habeas relief on a claim “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” this Court, §2254(d)(1). The District Court granted the petition, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding it unreasonable for the state court to affirm Sarausad’s conviction because the jury instruction on accomplice liability was ambiguous and there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury misinterpreted the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving Sarausad’s knowledge of a shooting beyond a reasonable doubt."

Decision and Legal Argument

The Court decided that because the state-court decision did not result in an "unreasonable application..of clearly established Federal law," (which is what sec. 2254(d)(1) requires), the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief to Sarausad.

Here is its central legal argument:

"When a state court’s application of governing federal law is challenged, the decision “ ‘must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.’ ” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U. S. 433 (per curiam). A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a jury instruction that quotes a state statute must show both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was “ ‘a reasonable likelihood’ ” that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62. The instruction “must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record,” ibid., and the pertinent question is whether the “instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,’ ” ibid.

Well, you can probably see where this is going. Because the WA courts' conclusion that the jury instruction was unambiguous and not objectively unreasonable, the Ninth Circuit should have ended its sec. 2254(d)(1) inquiry there. That is, the Ninth should have deferred to a state's interpretation of its own law in this instance.

But a nagging question still remains. Does the Ninth Circuit perform an independent review of whether the instructions are ambiguous or does it need to accept the conclusion of the highest state court on the issue? I suppose they do an independent review but the standard of "objective unreasonability" applies. Then, even if they are seen to be unreasonable, the next inquiry is whether these instructions produce a constitutional violation requiring reversal under AEDPA (sec. 2254(d)(1)). The majority concluded that this didn't happen here.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, two things influenced the decision, in my judgment. First, there is a "states right" issue--deferring to the wisdom of the states unless this "wisdom" can be shown to be foolishness. Second, there is a criminal law issue here--by affirming the WA State Supreme Court, the criminal got a tougher sentence. This is, after all, generally a "pro-prosecutor" Court. I, for one, however, think that there is ambiguity galore here...

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